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Abstract—Fine-grained electricity consumption information
has been proven to allow to infer people’s habits from their
consumption patterns. Hence, smart metering systems need a
secure way to regularly transmit the electricity consumption to
the supplier in such a way that the privacy of customers is
preserved. Several proposals can be found in the literature. Some
of them, classified as aggregative solutions, organize the meters
into groups and employ homomorphic cryptography in such a
way that the supplier only obtains the aggregated consumption
values of the meters in each group.
In this paper we propose a technique which allows to
remove the presence of a trusted dealer in one of the most
efficient current proposals. Furthermore, we increase the over-
all performance of the resulting system by employing elliptic
curve cryptography. The resulting system only requires a single
message sent from each smart meter to its substation, without
needing the meters to communicate among them. With the use
of elliptic curve cryptography, the only relevant computation
that the smart meters need to perform is a single elliptic curve
point multiplication by a scalar. The system has been proven to
be feasible and practical even for large neigborhoods including
several thousands of meters.
Index Terms—cryptography, elliptic curve, privacy, smart
meter
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart meters are household devices that transmit informa-
tion about electricity consumption to the energy supplier in
short intervals. Such information allows an accurate prediction
of consumption trends so that the production can be properly
adjusted avoiding electricity surplus. On the other side, cus-
tomers can benefit from an accurate billing, reduced prices,
and better knowledge of consumption habits. The EU aims to
replace at least 80% of electricity meters with smart meters
by 2020. Spain is expected to be the first in Europe to replace
all analogue electricity meters by the end of 2018.
Unfortunately, smart meters have been proven to be privacy
invasive. Fine-grained information about electricity consump-
tion allows to infer sensitive information such as the time a
customer leaves or arrives at home, watches TV, or goes to
bed. Hence, appropriate solutions have to be deployed in order
to preserve customers’privacy.
Privacy-preserving proposals for smart metering can be
classified into three main classes:
• Perturbative: Meters add some random noise to elec-
tricity consumption readings before transmitting them to
the energy supplier. In this way, the latter only obtains
a noisy version of household consumption profiles. Such
solutions [1] require to adjust the noise magnitude for
trading-off consumer privacy and data accuracy.
• Anonymous: Consumption values are transmitted so that
the energy supplier can not determine the identity of
transmitters. In proposals [2], [3], each meter has a
unique pseudonym which is attached to metering data. In
proposal [4] data are transmitted without a pseudonym,
while, in [5], each pseudonym is shared among several
meters.
• Aggregative: Meters are clustered into groups that add
their readings prior to transmitting them to their substa-
tion. Data are usually aggregated by a trusted party [6] or
by making use of some homomorphic cryptosystem [7],
[8], [9], [10], [11].
In the smart metering literature it is common to find
hybrid proposals combining both perturbative techniques with
aggregative ones [8], [10]. In those cases, the meters add some
random noise to their data before transmitting them so that
the substation obtains a noisy aggregation of consumption
readings. The noise added by the meters is usually chosen
in such a way that differential privacy is provided [12].
A. Aggregative solutions
Aggregative solutions are designed so that the substation
can only obtain the addition of meters consumption readings.
Most proposals make use of homomorphic encryption.
Proposal [7] requires each meter to have a public key of
some additive homomorphic cryptosystem. The transmission
protocol has a rather elevated O(n2) communication cost for
a neighborhood composed of n meters.
The approach described in [8] makes use of the Paillier
cryptosystem. There exists a neighborhood public key whose
private key is distributed among all the meters. The protocol
for consumption readings transmission has an efficient linear
cost, but the key setup for a distributed Paillier is very
complicated when a trusted dealer is not desirable.
The protocol described in [9] uses a distributed threshold
ElGamal cryptosystem in order to create a distributed group
key y among the meters by themselves. When the meters are
requested to send their readings mi, each of them generates
a random integer zi and encrypts and sends
Ey(g
mi+zi) = (ci, di).
The substation then aggregates all messages together, obtain-
ing (c, d) = (
∏
ci,
∏
di). The value c is sent back to all
the meters which employ their private keys xi to compute a
partial decryption
Ti = c
xi · gzi
which is transmitted to the substation. The substation then
computes
D = gm = d · (
∏
Ti)
−1.
It finally solves an easy instance of the discrete logarithm
problem, obtaining the sum of all the readings m = loggD.
The proposal [10] involves a trusted dealer that generates
a set of random values {s0, . . . , sn} whose addition is zero.
Then, the substation receives s0 while the remaining values
are secretly distributed among the meters. At time step t, each
meter Mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, encrypts its reading mi by computing
ci = g
mi ·H(t)si ,
and sends ci to the substation which aggregates all the
received ciphertexts as
V = H(t)s0
n∏
i=1
ci,
so that the resulting value is V = g
∑
mi . Finally, the added
readings are obtained by solving the discrete logarithm of V
to the base g.
This basic proposal is extended in [10] to provide differen-
tial privacy. The mentioned proposal is very lightweight and
only requires unidirectional communications from the meters
to the substation. Its drawback is the presence of a trusted
dealer for key distribution. A similar approach which requires
a trusted dealer that generates an RSA modulus is described
in [11].
B. Trusted dealer avoidance
The aggregation-based proposal from [10] has been proven
to be secure, and has very reduced computational and commu-
nication costs. Unfortunately, it requires a trusted dealer for
key setup. As mentioned in [13], the requirement of a trusted
dealer can be replaced with a TTP-free protocol permitting
full-length cleartext homomorphic addition.
The proposals [8], [11] allow homomorphic full-length
cleartext addition but require complicated protocols for a
distributed generation of hard-to-factor modulus in a trusted
dealer-free deployment.
On the other side, the proposal described in [9], which is
based on a distributed ElGamal cryptosystem, offers a very
simple distributed setup. Its drawback comes from the fact
that the resulting aggregated cleartext is obtained after solving
a discrete logarithm. Hence, it can only be employed for
obtaining the addition of reduced length cleartexts.
C. Contribution and plan of this paper
The objective of this paper is the design of an efficient and
easy to configure system able to be employed during the key
establishment phase of [10] so as to avoid the presence of a
trusted dealer. We propose a method which takes advantage
of the simple setup provided by [9] while addressing its
limitation of not being able to cope with full-length aggregated
cleartexts.
The paper has been structured as follows. Section I has pro-
vided an overview to the privacy challenges to be addressed by
smart metering systems and has also introduced the objective
of our research. Next, our proposal is described in Section II.
The security of the proposal is analized in Section III while
Section IV proves its feasibility by means of experimental
results. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section V.
II. OUR PROPOSAL
Along the paper we assume the use of elliptic curve
cryptography [14] which significantly reduces the size of the
involved messages reducing also the computational cost.
The required trusted dealer in [10] will be avoided by
employing [9] at the key establishment phase.
The system in [9] allows the transmission of short clear-
texts by the smart meters, whose addition is obtained by
the substation. We will assume the maximum bitlength of
cleartexts to be 13 bits so that, in a neighborhood of up to 128
smart meters, the aggregated message can be obtained by the
substation after solving a 20 bits discrete logarithm problem,
which took less than half a second in all our experiments.
By using elliptic curve cryptography, the bitlength of the
secret values si, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, to be distributed during the key
establishment in [10] can be reduced to 256 bits (down from
the original 2048, even obtaining a slightly higher security
level). We propose to split such secrets into twenty 13-
bits fragments, and transmit the aggregation of those short
fragments using [9] in such a way that the substation is
able to obtain
∑n
i=1 si by combining the received aggregated
fragments without obtaining any information about the indi-
vidual secrets. By setting s0 to be −
∑n
i=1 si, we get that∑n
i=0 si = 0.
A. Setup
The setup needs to be done before deploying the system.
• Choose an elliptic curve E defined over a prime field Fq ,
and a point P ∈ E(Fq) with prime order p of at least
256 bits.
• Choose a hash function H that returns a point belonging
to the subgroup of E(Fq) generated by P given an input
t representing the current time step.
B. Key establishment
The key establishment phase has to be performed before
the first execution of the protocol and each time that a smart
meter is added or removed from the neighborhood. The secret
si generated by each smart meter should be similar in size to
p.
• Each smart meter Mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, generates a random
secret si < p which is then bitwisely split into l chunks
sij of at most 13 bits each such that
si = (sil|| . . . ||si2||si1).
It is required that 13 · l is equal or bigger than the size
(in bits) of p.
• The meters and the substation execute the protocol in [9]
l times (which can be run in parallel). After each execu-
tion j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, the substation obtains ∑ni=1 sij .
Then the substation computes
s′0 =
l∑
j=1
(
213·(j−1) ·
n∑
i=1
sij
)
=
n∑
i=1
si,
and finally sets its secret s0 to be s0 = −s′0 (mod p).
Note that
∑n
i=0 si = 0 (mod p) as required in [10].
C. Consumption transmission
In a smart metering neighborhood, the meters regularly
communicate with their substation. At each time step t, every
smart meter Mi sends its consumption reading mi to the
substation SSt. The time step may be simply represented as
an integer that is incremented by one after each round.
The consumption readings at time step t are transmitted as
follows:
• Each meter Mi (storing its secret si) transmits its reading
mi by computing an elliptic curve point Ci as
Ci = mi · P + si ·H(t), (1)
which is then sent to the substation.
• The substation receives and aggregates all the points Ci
by computing:
C =
n∑
i=1
Ci = m · P +
n∑
i=1
si ·H(t),
with m =
∑n
i=1mi.
• Then, the substation computes:
D=C + s0 ·H(t)=m · P + s ·H(t)= m · P,
since s =
∑n
i=0 si = 0.
• Finally, the substation computes the discrete logarithm
of D to the base P to get the aggregated readings of all
the meters:
m =
n∑
i=1
mi = logP D.
Since the computed discrete logarithm is known to be short,
it can be efficiently computed by means of Pollard’s Lambda
algorithm [15].
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of [9], [10] holds on the assumed difficulty of
solving the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem.
Given a multiplicative group G of prime order p with gen-
erator g, and given ga and gb (a and b are unknown), the
computation of gab is assumed to be hard. The elliptic curve
definition of that problem is straightforward by replacing the
multiplicative notation with an additive one.
In [9], it is shown that obtaining a partial aggregation of the
values sent by the smart meters is as hard as solving the CDH
problem. Since we employ [9] during the key establishment
phase, no information about the individual secrets si is leaked
during that phase.
Regarding the transmission of consumption values, we
can use [10, Theorem 1] adapted to elliptic curves which
proves that the construction in Eq. 1 satisfies aggregator
oblivious security (the aggregator is incapable of obtaining
any information other that the desired sum of values) in the
encrypt-once model.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we test the feasibility of our proposal through
experimentation.
The most time-consuming part of the proposal are the
computations of the discrete logarithms required both in ‘key
establishment’ and ‘consumption transmission’. We have first
considered neighborhoods composed of 128 meters, each of
them sending a 13 bits number as a cleartext so that the overall
aggregated cleartext requires 7 additional bits. Hence, these
discrete logarithms have a 20 bits solution.
By using 13 bits, a transmitted cleartext can accomodate the
consumption reading of a client during a 30 minutes period.
These figures were already proposed in [9].
We used a custom elliptic curve cryptography library and
an implementation of Pollard’s Lambda algorithm [15] for
solving the discrete logarithm problem. Pollard’s Lambda is
a generic algorithm for solving the discrete logarithm that
can be implemented on any cyclic group and, in particular,
on the group of points of an elliptic curve as required in
our work. Pollard’s Lambda algorithm is efficient at solving
discrete logarithms when the solution is known to be in a
small interval {a, . . . , b}. Its time complexity is O(√b− a).
The implementation was done in Java (version 1.8.0 92)
and executed on a computer with an Intel R© CoreTM i5-4460
processor running at 3.2 GHz with 16 GB of RAM, using
only one of the four cores.
We solved 1000 instances of the problem obtaining an
average time of 0.1 seconds per computation. Note that due
to the random nature of the algorithm, it can take much more
(or much less) time in some instances. In our experiments,
the maximum time never surpassed 0.5 seconds.
We also considered the possibility of assuming larger
groups of meters (several buildings, entire streets, neighbor-
hoods or towns). Doubling the size of the group requires one
additional bit for representing the aggregated consumption.
In order to test the feasibility over larger groups, we solved
larger instances of the problem.
Meters Bits Average Maximum
128 20 0.10 s 0.48 s
512 22 0.21 s 0.87 s
2048 24 0.42 s 1.48 s
8192 26 0.81 s 4.29 s
32768 28 1.57 s 7.08 s
TABLE I
AVERAGE AND MAXIMUM TIMES FOR SOLVING THE DISCRETE
LOGARITHM PROBLEM OVER ELLIPTIC CURVES
Table I shows, for several group sizes, the bitlength of
the discrete logarithm to be computed, and the average and
maximum running times.
It can be seen that taking 4 times larger groups (which
adds 2 bits to the logarithm) doubles the average running time.
This is the expected behavior considering the time complexity
of Pollard’s Lambda algorithm. Due to its random nature,
however, the maximum times are more difficult to predict,
but our experiments show that they roughly double every two
bits. Nevertheless, these extreme times are very unusual.
Our experiments show that larger groups with even 8192
meters are still affordable, since the average time takes less
than a second and, in the worst case, it never takes more than
5 seconds. If larger groups were needed, we could employ a
more powerful computer, or implement a multicore version
of the algorithm.
The cost of the key establishment phase, which needs to
be performed each time a smart meter is added or removed
from the group, is mostly determined by the computation of
l discrete logarithms, each of size the bitlength of 213 · n.
The cost of the remaining computations is negligible. In our
experiments, in the largest considered neighborhood (32768
meters), the execution of a key establishment phase would
take around 30 seconds. Note, however, that a smart metering
neighborhood is a rather static scenario so that such executions
would be quite infrequent.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a system that allows to
remove the need for a trusted third party during the key
establishment phase of an existing privacy-preserving smart
metering system. We also propose to implement it employing
elliptic curve cryptography which allows the use of much
shorter keys. The system is based on combining two existing
proposals, which were already proven to be secure and private.
In the resulting system, the link between electricity con-
sumption values and the customers is broken by homomor-
phically adding the readings. Since there is no trusted party,
even assuming a corrupted substation and some malicious
smart meters, the individual readings are still kept private: the
only information such a corrupted coalition can obtain is the
addition of the readings of the remaining honest meters. The
resulting protocol does not require communication among the
smart meters, and reading consumptions are transmitted by
sending only one message per round. For the meters, the only
relevant computation per round is an elliptic curve point mul-
tiplication by a full-length scalar. The substation is required
to solve an easy instance of the discrete logarithm problem
at each round. With an appropriate choice of parameters, this
computation has been shown to be solvable in less than one
second in a standard computer.
The elliptic curve point multiplication by a scalar performed
by the meters, when using projective coordinates and an
appropriate curve, can be achieved in general with 12 multi-
plications, 2 squares, 6 additions, and 1 doubling in the base
field Fq , so that only basic modular operations are needed.
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